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retained, and released. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy
Act is the only statute of the three that enshrines a private right of
action for those who fail to properly handle biometric data. Both
the Texas Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act Information Act
and the Washington Biometric Privacy Act allow for state
Attorneys General to bring suit on behalf of aggrieved consumers.
This Note examines these three statutes in the context of data
security and potential remedies for victims of data breaches or
mishandled data. Ultimately, this Note makes policy proposals for
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private right of action as the most effective remedy for victims of
biometric data breaches.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea of using your voice, eyes, or face as a means of
interfacing with a computer system has been something that has
captured the public imagination since the advent of science fiction
television and film in the 20th century. Popular shows and films
such as Star Trek, Robocop, and Back to the Future provided
examples of a future where the unique biological traits of
characters could be used as a means of controlling computers,
creating databases, and even securing one’s home.1 Over the
course of the last sixty years, however, the idea of using a device
to autonomously authenticate one’s biological traits went from
being science fiction to reality. Today, nearly half of Americans
use biometric authenticators2—such as fingerprint-readers or facescanners—for security functions and payment authorization. Such
authenticators have become increasingly accessible in consumer
devices like smartphones and computers.3
Although many Americans do not seem to understand the
technology or its implications, biometric authentication has
1

See Rowena Bonnette, Biometrics in Movies Sci-Fi Security, AVATIER (Jan. 31,
2017),
https://www.avatier.com/blog/biometrics-in-sci-fi-movies
[https://perma.cc
/KCV5-GHYU].
2
See RACHEL L. GERMAN & K. SUZANNE BARBER, CONSUMER ATTITUDES ABOUT
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 2 (2018).
3
See J. Peter Bruzzese, Windows 10 Puts Biometric Security Front and Center,
INFOWORLD
(Mar.
25,
2015),
https://www.infoworld.com/article/2901068
/authentication/windows-10-biometric-security-front-and-center.html
[https://perma.cc/ZAA5-68RR]; Alex Perala, Smartphone Biometrics Are Officially
Mainstream: Acuity, MOBILE ID WORLD (Feb. 12, 2016), https://mobileidworld.com
/smartphone-biometrics-are-officially-mainstream-acuity-102124/
[https://perma.cc/D7VD-HT65]. Fingerprint is now the main ID Method on Mobile. Id.
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become increasingly popular in the last decade.4 This appeal can
be explained, in part, by the convenience it offers.5 Because
biometric identifiers are often parts of the human body, users of
biometric authentication will typically always have their identifier
with them.6 Unlike a password or pin, a biometric identifier does
not have be “memorized” and, similarly, cannot be “forgotten,”
making it a convenient alternative to older, more analog methods
of authentication.7 Further, biometric authenticators can enable a
user to interface with data more quickly and efficiently than a
traditional password.8 For some users, the use of biometric
authentication gives them the perception of a security advantage,
the reasoning being that the use of an immutable biological
characteristic might make it more difficult for malicious third
parties to gain access to certain types of information by stealing the
“password.”9 However, many cybersecurity experts have expressed
skepticism at the idea that biometric authentication can provide
any unique security advantage over more traditional means.10

4

See GERMAN & BARBER, supra note 2, at 11 fig.7. When asked “Have you ever
personally provided identifying characteristics to an organization for such a computermatched biometric comparison?” consumers polled by the University of Texas at Austin
Center for Identity answered “No” or “Don’t Know” 64.4% of the time. Id. 70.4% of
consumers in the same poll said they had used fingerprint scanners before. Id. at 5 fig.2.
5
See Biometric Security Systems: A Guide to Devices, Fingerprint Scanners and
Facial Recognition Access Control, IFSEC GLOBAL (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.ifsecglobal.com/biometric-security-systems-guide-devices-fingerprintscanners-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/2CMM-PB9V]; see also VISA, GOODBYE,
PASSWORDS. HELLO, BIOMETRICS. (2017).
6
See Tracy V. Wilson, How Biometrics Works, HOW STUFF WORKS,
https://science.howstuffworks.com/biometrics.htm [https://perma.cc/EP6S-HKSH] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also infra Section III.A.
7
See Wilson, supra note 6.
8
Lisa Eadicicco, How to Make Your iPhone’s Fingerprint Scanner More Reliable,
TIME (Dec. 12, 2016), http://time.com/4441448/how-to-improve-touch-id-iphone/
[https://perma.cc/T5KV-2H5B].
9
See Ramya Raju, The Advantages of a Biometric Identification Management System,
M2SYS BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.m2sys.com/blog/biometric-hardware
/advantages-biometric-identification-management-system/
[https://perma.cc/S4WDUMC6].
10
See April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious Security Concerns,
WIRED (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/biometrics-comingalong-serious-security-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/XW3D-YEA8].
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Concerns about security are not unfounded given that instances
of data breaches and cybercrime are on the rise.11 Common targets
include businesses, large and small, governments, and
individuals.12 From a security perspective, the sensitive nature of
biometrics presents unique risks.13 While biometric identifiers may
be difficult to access, and in some cases deter malicious third
parties like hackers, their irreplaceable nature imbues such data
with a particular sensitivity.14 Should a hacker successfully steal an
individual’s biometric data point, any information associated with
that particular biometric authenticator can be put at risk.15 Unlike a
password or pin that can be changed if compromised, the
permanence of certain biological traits results in a compromised
individual never being able to securely use a stolen biometric for
authentication again.16 Simply put, if your fingerprint data is
stolen, it is not possible to change your fingerprint. Despite this,

11

See Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INSTIT.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime
[https://perma.cc/3ZRU-3K9C] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
12
See Kevin McCoy, Cyber Breach at Equifax Could Affect 143M U.S. Consumers,
TODAY
(Sept.
7,
2017,
5:17
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com
USA
/story/money/2017/09/07/credit-reporting-giant-equifax-says-cyber-breach-could-affect143-m-u-s-consumers/643679001/ [https://perma.cc/G26L-6GMK]; Andrea Peterson,
OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many as
Previously Thought, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sep. 23, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-thanfive-million-fingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.21563242188b [https://perma.cc/AL5F-6C2B]; Small Business Cyber Security and
Data Breach Risks, INSUREON,
https://www.insureon.com/resources/research/small-business-cyber-security-poll
[https://perma.cc/5JEN-CGCL] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
13
See The Editors, Biometric Security Poses Huge Privacy Risks, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/biometric-securityposes-huge-privacy-risks/ [https://perma.cc/D79U-5SE8]; Chiara A. Sottile, As Biometric
Scanning Use Grows, So Does Security Risk, NBC NEWS: MACH (July 24, 2016, 7:23
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/mach/biometric-scanning-use-grows-so-dosecurity-risks-ncna593161 [https://perma.cc/B6DJ-ULHA].
14
See supra note 13.
15
See id.
16
See id.
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biometric authentication’s popularity as a service has proceeded
undisturbed.17
Because of biometrics’ relative novelty, there are currently no
federal laws that specifically address the responsibilities of
businesses collecting, using, or releasing biometric data.18 While
several states have attempted to address this concern, only three
states have proven successful.19 In 2008, Illinois passed the
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), becoming the first
state to pass a statute addressing biometric authentication.20 One
year later, Texas followed suit and passed the Capture or Use
Biometric Identifier Act (“CUBI”).21 Following the passage of
BIPA and CUBI, many states attempted to introduce their own
legislation addressing biometric data security.22 However, it was
not until 2017, eight years after CUBI’s passage, that Washington
became the third state to introduce such a law, known as the
Washington Biometric Privacy Act (“WBPA”).23 Unlike CUBI,
which shared some features with the at-the-time recent BIPA, the
WBPA distinguishes itself from its predecessors by adding unique
features and excluding other specific provisions and ideas.24
17

See RACHEL L. GERMAN & K. SUZANNE BARBER, CURRENT BIOMETRIC ADOPTION
TRENDS (2018); Alex Koma, Study: Americans Increasingly Accept Biometric Tech
for Security, FEDSCOOP (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.fedscoop.com/study-americansincreasingly-accept-governments-using-biometric-technologies-for-surveillance-security/
[https://perma.cc/3TUR-369F].
18
See Biometric Data and the General Data Protection Regulation, GEMALTO,
https://www.gemalto.com/govt/biometrics/biometric-data [https://perma.cc/4SK2-FLUA]
(last updated Feb. 18, 2018).
19
See id.
20
Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
21
Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
22
See Divya Taneja, Washington Enacts a Biometric Privacy Statute in a Departure
from the Existing Standard, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA AND TECH. L. BLOG (June 13,
2017),
https://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/06/13/washington-enacts-a-biometric-privacystatute-in-a-departure-from-the-existing-standard/ [https://perma.cc/T4GN-LFR4].
23
Washington Biometric Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017); see also
Taneja, supra note 22; Rebecca Yergin, Washington Becomes Third State with a
INSIDE
PRIVACY
(May
31,
2017),
Biometric
Law,
COVINGTON:
https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/state-legislatures/washington-becomes-thethird-state-with-a-biometric-law/ [https://perma.cc/3X9F-ASD3].
24
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
AND
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While these statutes recognize the unusual challenges that
biometric authentication poses, each proposes different approaches
in defining biometrics and enforcement options. There is evidence
to suggest, however, that BIPA, the oldest of these state biometric
statutes, might be the most effective privacy law of its peers due to
the private right of action it provides and its hardline stance against
the sale of biometric data.25 This Note will attempt to examine the
language of these statutes, analyze their functions critically
amongst the current backdrop of legal options available in
addressing cybersecurity threats, and suggest elements that should
be included in biometric privacy statutes moving forward. Part I
will examine data privacy law in the United States, the basics of
biometric technology, and introduce the three current biometric
privacy statutes. remedies for consumer data breaches, biometrics,
and the statutory language of BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA. Part II
will discuss the remedies available to data breach victims, and their
limitations. Part III will closely examine and explain the statutory
language of BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA. Finally, Part IV will
critically examine BIPA, CUBI, and the WBPA, and offer
recommendations for creating ideal biometric privacy legislation
moving forward.
I. BIOMETRICS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Data Insecurity
In the world of computing, data is “information in digital form
that can be transmitted or processed.”26 “Information” can be
anything, including strings of plain text, numbers, pictures, and
executable software programs.27 On most computers, this
information is converted into a binary number sequence, made up
of zeroes and ones, and stored on a hardware drive that the

25

See discussion infra Section III.A.
Data,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data
[https://perma.cc/L3N2-A2YQ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
27
See
Data,
TECH
TERMS,
https://techterms.com/definition/data
[https://perma.cc/94RQ-8Y5C] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
26
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computer can read.28 Nearly all businesses today use computers to
operate.29
As a result of this reliance on computers, businesses often store
sensitive and private data on their computers in some capacity.30
Consequently, when sensitive data is leaked or accessed, it can be
potentially harmful if it falls into the wrong hands. A data breach
occurs when data is stolen, compromised, or otherwise
unintentionally disclosed.31 The term data breach usually invokes
the image of malicious hackers who gain access to sensitive data
through illicit means such as using targeted malware, tricking
third-party service providers, or even targeting unprotected
personal devices.32 A data breach, however, can be as simple as an
employee stealing information that he is entrusted with throughout
the course of his work.33 Regardless of how a breach occurs, its
consequences impact a shockingly high number of Americans each
year with increasing frequency.34 In 2016 alone, there were at least
two data breaches made public for each day of the year.35 In 2014,
some estimates concluded that up to 47% of American adults have
28

See id.
See C.D. Crowder, Uses for Computers in Business, CHRON,
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/uses-computers-business-56844.html
[https://perma.cc/9CK6-T6YR] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
30
See Data Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/businesscenter/privacy-and-security/data-security [https://perma.cc/46ZK-U2KY] (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019); Kelly Sheridan, Large Majority of Businesses Store Sensitive Data in
(Apr. 16, 2018),
Cloud
Despite
Lack
of Trust,
DARK READING
https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/large-majority-of-businesses-store-sensitive-data-incloud-despite-lack-of-trust/d/d-id/1331538 [https://perma.cc/P6PT-9BR4].
31
See
Margaret
Rouse,
Data
Breach,
TECHTARGET,
https:/
/searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach
[https://perma.cc/G3LA-8CTR]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
32
See Eric Basu, The Top 5 Data Breach Vulnerabilities, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2015, 11:44
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2015/11/05/the-top-5-data-breachvulnerabilities/#39dfa1ae4d04 [https://perma.cc/NSU3-9SRZ].
33
See id.
34
See Mike Snider, Your Data was Probably Stolen in Cyberattack in 2018 – and You
Should Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/2018/12/28/data-breaches-2018-billions-hit-growing-number-cyberattacks
/2413411002/ [https://perma.cc/3BAX-M7TG].
35
See generally 2016 Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE: DATA
BREACHES, https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/ZH5P-M9Z3]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
29
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had their private information stolen through data breaches.36 As
incidents of cybercrime and data breaches increase in frequency
each day, there are concerns that such events are inevitable; as
former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert Mueller
once expressed, “there are only two types of companies: those that
have been hacked and those that will be.”37
B. Biometric Basics
The process of using anatomical or behavioral traits and
characteristics as a form of automatic identification is known today
as biometric authentication.38 These unique traits and
characteristics, or “biometric identifiers,” can include a fingerprint,
voice, iris, and facial shape.39 Biometric authentication can be used
to accomplish a wide variety of technological objectives including
securing computers, accessing financial information, or even
tracking attendance in a workplace.40
Biometric authentication works by capturing an individual’s
unique biological identifier and storing it as a data point.41 This
data point is then used as a means of comparing the trait against
future instances of its use.42 For example, a fingerprint reader
works by capturing an image of the unique pattern of ridges on
your finger, and then compares that image from that point forward
with any input from a fingerprint that the reader receives.43 If the
36
See Jose Pagliery, Half of American Adults Hacked This Year, CNN (May 28, 2014,
9:25 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/28/technology/security/hack-data-breach/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H42K-KYJ8].
37
Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at RSA Cyber
Security Conf. (Mar. 1, 2012).
38
See An Overview of Biometric Recognition, COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20120107071003/http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/info.html
[https://perma.cc/4LUK-S895] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
39
See id.
40
See John Trader, The Top 5 Uses of Biometrics Across the Globe, M2SYS BLOG
(Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.m2sys.com/blog/biometric-hardware/top-5-uses-biometricsacross-globe [https://perma.cc/Q3U7-28ZH].
41
See COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U., supra note 38; Wilson, supra note 6.
42
See COMPUT. SCI. ENG’G, MICH. ST. U., supra note 38; Wilson, supra note 6.
43
See Chris Woodford, Biometric Fingerprint Scanners, EXPLAIN THAT STUFF!,
http://www.explainthatstuff.com/fingerprintscanners.html
[https://perma.cc/SFN9AHH8] (last updated June 28, 2018).
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input received matches the previously captured fingerprint image,
the technology decides that the user’s identity has been verified
and can grant access to secured data or trigger an activity of some
kind.44 This same basic principle can be applied to other forms of
biometric authentication such as iris scanners, facial recognition, or
voiceprints.
The particular sensitivity of biometric data raises serious
concerns in the age of cybercrime. If compromised, information
such as credit card numbers, passwords, and other sensitive
information can be used to commit fraud, identity theft, harassment
among other crimes.45 Despite this increased risk of harm, there are
ways for almost all of those forms of data to be replaced over time
one way or another.46 When a biometric data point is stolen
however, there is no way to replace an individual’s biometric
identifier.47 Unlike the film Face/Off, face-replacing technology
with no risk of biological rejection and minimal recovery time does
not currently exist.48 The increased risk of harm caused by the theft
of biometric data can potentially last in perpetuity, forever
restricting an individual from using that biometric identifier as a
security point safely ever again. As incidents of data breaches
increase in frequency, reports of massive biometric data breaches
44

See id.
See Jessica Dickler, 41 Million Americans Have Had Their Identities Stolen, CNBC
(Oct. 11, 2016, 8:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/10/41-million-americanshave-had-their-identities-stolen.html [https://perma.cc/W5KZ-SNKL].
46
See Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where It All
Goes, TREND MICRO USA (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.trendmicro.com
/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/data-breach-101 [https://perma.cc/Q6GW-2MRU].
47
See The Editors, supra note 13; Sottile, supra note 13.
48
Cf. FACE/OFF (Paramount Pictures 1997). While plastic surgeries exist that can
change a person’s face, undergoing a procedure significant enough to create a new facial
biometric is not without psychological or ethical concerns. See Changing Identity—Face
Transplant Ethics, ROYAL FREE LONDON NHS, https://www.royalfree.nhs.uk
/services/services-a-z/plastic-surgery/facial-reconstruction-and-face-transplants/changing
-identity-face-transplant-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/48BL-G2KX] (last visited Mar. 7,
2019). Further, recovery from facial surgery is a difficult and lengthy process unlike the
relatively quick procedure in Face/Off. Compare Human Caniomaxillo
Allotransplantation: A Face Transplant Research Study, JOHN HOPKINS MEDICINE:
COMPREHENSIVE TRANSPLANT CENTER, https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/transplant
/programs/reconstructive_transplant/face_transplant.html#rehabilitation [https://perma.cc
/3HX6-HLM8 ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019), with FACE/OFF (Paramount Pictures 1997).
45
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both in America49 and abroad50 raise serious questions about how
victims of such breaches can protect themselves.
C. Today’s Biometric Data Privacy Statutes
Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act was first
introduced to the Illinois Senate in February 2008 following the
bankruptcy of a San Francisco based company known as Pay by
Touch.51 Pay By Touch provided vendors with devices that used
biometric authentication to allow consumers to pay for their goods
by connecting their financial information to their fingerprint.52
Following the company’s bankruptcy and dissolution, consumers
were given no information as to what would become of the
biometric data or financial information they had provided to Pay
By Touch.53 This incident was an impetus for BIPA’s drafting and
eventual passage.54 One year later in 2009, Texas passed its own
biometric privacy statute known as the Capture or Use Biometric
Identifier Act Information Act. Finally, after an eight-year gap,
Washington passed its Washington Biometric Privacy Act in 2017.
Each of these statutes sets out to regulate the Capture or Use
Biometric Identifier Act data in different ways, particularly with
regard to enforcement against entities who misuse or misplace that
data.55 Although the remedies these statutes propose represent only
a portion of potential remedies available to data breach victims,
enforcement in the world of data privacy law remains complicated
and ever-changing due to the relatively new kinds of harm that
technology presents.56

49

See Peterson, supra note 12.
See Rohith Jyothish, The World’s Biggest Biometric Database Keeps Leaking
People’s Data, FAST CO. (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40516447/theworlds-biggest-biometric-database-keeps-leaking-peoples-data [https://perma.cc/K58AYJHP].
51
See Justin O. Kay, The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, DRINKER BIDDLE
& REATH 1, https://www.acc.com/sites/default/files/2019-02/Drinker-Biddle-2017-1BIPA-Article-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-JRUM] (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
52
See id.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See infra Part III.
56
See infra Part II.
50
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II. CURRENT DATA BREACH ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES
When a data breach occurs, it can often be difficult or
impossible to hold the party who compromised the data legally
responsible. Consequently, consumer data breach victims can
typically only hold the private entity with which they entrusted
their data accountable for the breach. In most situations, impacted
victims have one of four options: (1) a private lawsuit, (2) a class
action suit, (3) private arbitration, or (4) state attorneys general
action.57
A. Private Lawsuits
Bringing a private suit for a data breach can be a complicated
process depending on which state a victim finds herself in. Few
states have statutes that address the possibility of a private right of
action in the event of a data breach and, of those that do, some
specific restrictions may apply.58 Data breach notification statutes
in California or Louisiana, for example, allow for a private right of
action only when a compromised entity fails to notify users of the
breach.59 Further, both of these statutes require a victim suffer
“actual harm,” sometimes referred to as “tangible” or “cognizable
harm,” as a result of the breach, something that can be difficult to
prove due to the at times complex and abstract nature of the data
stolen.60 Other states, such as Alaska or Massachusetts, have
statutes that enable data breach victims to sue for deceptive or
unfair business practices instead of directly addressing data
breaches.61 If a state does not have a statute that might provide a
private right of action for data breach, the risk involved in privately
suing a compromised entity increases as the suit would have to rely

57

See Ian Salisbury, Wanna Sue Equifax? Here Are All Your Options, TIME (Sep. 22,
2017),
http://time.com/money/4949869/equifax-data-breach-lawsuits/
[https://perma.cc/G5WS-9T5X].
58
See BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, DATA BREACH CHARTS: JULY 2018 26,
https://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Dat
a_Breach_Charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUD4-USAT] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.

2019]

FACE OFF

583

on legal theories independent of specific laws.62 Ultimately, any
private suit against a compromised entity may present an
unbearably high level of risk depending on the amount of financial
and legal resources available.63
B. Class Action Lawsuits
Class action suits may provide a more economical option to
victims of data breaches, however, such suits can present a
different host of challenges. First, few class action complaints are
ever filed against breached entities relative to the amount of
breaches that occur.64 While 806 data breaches were made public
in 2016, only seventy-six class action complaints were filed
throughout the year.65 Of those seventy-six complaints, only
twenty-seven unique defendants were named resulting in only
3.3% of publicly reported breaches leading to class action
litigation.66 Class action suits against breached entities can also
have difficulties with the predominance requirement of class
certification due to difficulty proving that losses resulting from
fraudulent transactions are consistent amongst the class.67 The
challenge of proving actual harm can also impact class action suits.
In a 2015 case involving a class action suit against eBay for a data
breach resulting in the exposure of users’ “personally identifiable
information” (“PII”),68 a federal judge dismissed the suit finding
62

See Matt Garry, My Data Has Been Breached—Can I Sue?, MICH. TECH. L. REV.,
https://mttlr.org/2018/10/my-data/ [https://perma.cc/7XYM-TDAD] (last visited Mar. 7,
2019).
63
See Richard Cordray, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/JX87-6S8G]; Salisbury, supra note 57.
64
See David Zetoony et al., 2017 Data Breach Litigation Report, BRYAN CAVE LLP,
https://d11m3yrngt251b.cloudfront.net/images/content/9/6/v2/96690/Bryan-Cave-DataBreach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5EA-BC8K] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2019).
65
See id. at 3.
66
See id. at 1.
67
See generally Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047 (E.D.
La. May 4, 2015); Mathew J. Schwartz, Why So Many Data Breach Lawsuits Fail, BANK
INFO. SEC. (May 11, 2015), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/data-breach-lawsuits-faila-8213 [https://perma.cc/BM8F-Q7JF].
68
Personally identifiable information, generally, is data that can be used to identify or
de-anonymize a particular person. See What Is Personally Identifiable Information (PII)?,
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that the plaintiffs had no Article III standing as they did not suffer
actual harm from the breach.69 There, the court stated that an
increased risk of identity theft resulting from the breach did not
constitute actual harm.70 In 2016, the Supreme Court held in
Robins v. Spokeo that “intangible harm,” including risk of harm,
could be considered “concrete” for the purposes of Article III
standing, giving courts some guidance in addressing data breach
harms.71 However, there has since been little guidance as to when a
particular harm is “concrete.”72 Now, while not all courts agree
that future risk of harm resulting from data breaches does not
constitute harm, the risk of being dismissed remains.73 Further,
class action suits can generally be very risky with some studies
finding that few end with a final judgment on the merits for the
plaintiffs and even fewer produce any benefit to the plaintiffs.74
C. Arbitration
While private arbitration is occasionally a data breach victim’s
choice, it is often the only means available to compromised
consumers.75 Mandatory arbitration clauses are written into many
contracts and agreements between consumers and private entities,
LIFELOCK, https://www.lifelock.com/learn-identity-theft-resources-what-is-personallyidentifiable-information.html [https://perma.cc/5VHQ-BAFV] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019);
see also PII, Anonymized Data, and Big Data Privacy, SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE (Feb.
12, 2015),
https://www.smartdatacollective.com/pii-anonymized-data-and-big-dataprivacy/ [https://perma.cc/A29K-3ENT]. The PII exposed in Green included users’
names, mailing addresses, birthdates, and more. See Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at
*2–4, *15–16.
69
See Green, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2–4, *15–16.
70
See id. at *15–16.
71
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
72
See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 744 (2018).
73
See generally In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1216 (N.D. Cal.
2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp.
2d 942, 963 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
74
See MAYER BROWN LLP, Do Class Actions Benefit Class Members? An Empirical
Analysis of Class Actions, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Class_Action_Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WTR-LPM2] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
75
See Arbitration, NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER ADVOCATES,
https://www.consumeradvocates.org/for-consumers/arbitration [https://perma.cc/43C4ZL6L] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
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especially in matters related to finances.76 Such clauses, should
private entities choose to enforce them, can effectively bar a
consumer’s right to sue entirely.77 In many contracts and
agreements, mandatory arbitration clauses can be difficult to catch
in the fine print and, in the past, private entities have attempted to
enforce such arrangements on consumers even without formal
agreements.78 Arbitration can also be costly for an aggrieved
individual and prevent her from having an opportunity to present
her case to a judge.79 A 2015 Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) study found that, on average, group lawsuits
were more effective in getting plaintiffs money than arbitration.80
Further, a study of one particular arbitration firm found that
businesses prevailed ninety-four percent of the time.81 Although
76

See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015).
77
See NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER ADVOCATES, supra note 75.
78
See Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the Rights of Consumers,
Employees, and Small Businesses, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org
/article/mandatory-arbitration-clausesundermining-rights-consumers-employees-andsmall-businesses [https://perma.cc/5NUE-9MJ3] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). The
proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses should be of little surprise given how few
Americans read terms of service or privacy policies, and how long it would take to do so
each year. See David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of
Service, Studies Confirm, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:38 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contractsfine-print [https://perma.cc/8PH2-MPCS]; Keith Wagstaff, You’d Need 76 Work Days to
Read All Your Privacy Policies Each Year, TIME (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://techland.time.com/2012/03/06/youd-need-76-work-days-to-read-all-your-privacypolicies-each-year/ [https://perma.cc/PGQ6-WFF9]. Some arbitration clauses attempt to
forego formal agreements entirely; in one instance, General Mills attempted to bind any
consumer who “liked” its Facebook page to mandatory arbitration. See Ricardo Lopez,
General Mills Abandons Mandatory Arbitration after Consumer Outcry, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2014, 10:44 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-general-millslegal-policy-reversal-20140421-story.html [https://perma.cc/NNP7-ADQ4].
79
See Arbitration: Not Necessarily a Better Option Than Litigation, BTLG
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.btlg.us/News_and_Press/articles/arbitration.html
[https://perma.cc/HK72-PD56] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019); Gary Benton, Arbitrators Are
Not
Judges,
SILICON
VALLEY
ARBITRATION
&
MEDIATION
CENTER,
https://svamc.org/arbitrators-are-not-judges [https://perma.cc/A8GX-RW4F] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2019).
80
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 76; Cordray, supra note 63.
81
See John O’Donnell, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare
Consumers,
PUB.
CITIZEN
4
(2007),
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the CFPB added a rule to the Federal Register in July 2017
forbidding financial firms under the Bureau’s jurisdiction from
blocking consumers from joining class action suits, the rule was
repealed just four months later.82
D. State Attorneys General Actions
In the 1960s and 1970s, state attorneys general (“AG”)
established consumer protection divisions in their offices, as states,
with the FTC’s encouragement, began to adopt Unfair and
Deceptive Practices (“UDAP”) statutes.83 By the 1990s, state AG
offices started using UDAP laws to “protect consumers from
privacy-invasive business practices.”84 Since then, as Danielle
Citron notes in The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys
General, state AGs have used their tools to shape and change legal
norms surrounding data privacy violations. Despite these gains,
however, AG action gives data breach victims little control over
their recourse as AGs have ultimate discretion over what lawsuits
they file.85 Further, because AGs are elected officials, they remain
susceptible to political capture through special interest lobbying.86

https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/final_wcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AV2BL5XN].
82
See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Bankers Praise,
THE HILL (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trumprepeals-consumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking
[https://perma.cc/4L23-CYY7].
83
See Danielle K. Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 753–54 (2017).
84
Id. at 754.
85
See Emily Myers & Ayeisha Cox, The Authority of State Attorneys General and
Their Efforts on 21st Century Policing, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 202 (2016),
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Myers%20Cox%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QED9-U4N2].
86
See Citron, supra note 83.
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III. THE MECHANISMS OF TODAY’S STATE BIOMETRIC DATA
PRIVACY STATUTES
A. What is a Biometric Identifier?
BIPA defined the unique biological traits and characteristics
used for biometric authentication as “biometric identifiers”:
Section 10. Definitions. In this Act:
“Biometric identifier” means a retina or iris scan,
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face
geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include
writing samples, written signatures, photographs,
human biological samples used for valid scientific
testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo
descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height,
weight, hair color, or eye color.87
The use of the term “biometric identifier” as the subject of the
type of information being regulated is universal across all three
state statutes however, each law has its own unique definition of a
biometric identifier.88 For example, Texas’s Capture or Use
Biometric Identifier Act distinguishes itself from BIPA by defining
a biometric identifier as “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry.”89 Unlike BIPA,
CUBI’s definition offers no specific exemptions for what is not
considered a biometric identifier.90 The Washington Biometric
Privacy Act similarly distinguishes itself from its predecessors by
instead giving a general definition for a biometric identifier
followed by examples of what is or is not included by the
definition:
(1) “Biometric identifier” means data generated by
automatic measurements of an individual’s
biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint,
87

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008).
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
89
Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
90
See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(a) (2009) (“In this section, “biometric
identifier” means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face
geometry.”).
88
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voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or other unique
biological patterns or characteristics that is used to
identify a specific individual. “Biometric identifier”
does not include a physical or digital photograph,
video or audio recording or data generated
therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored
for health care treatment, payment, or operations
under the federal health insurance portability and
accountability act of 1996.91
B. Collectors of Biometric Information
All three statutes address the protection of biometric identifiers
in the possession of private corporations, although each statute
uses different language in referring to such entities.92 BIPA defines
such parties as “private entities” meaning “any individual,
partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or
other group, however organized” and specifically excludes a “State
or local government agency” or “any court of Illinois, a clerk of
the court, or a judge or justice thereof.”93 Conversely, WPBA and
CUBI refer to such parties as a “person.”94 According to WPBA, a
person is “an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability
company, organization, association, or any other legal or
commercial entity, but does not include a government agency.”95
For the purposes of this discussion, “private entity” will be used to
refer to the subjects of all three statutes.
C. Retention
Each statute addresses the retention of biometric data with
different levels of specificity. The WBPA states:
(4) A person who knowingly possesses a biometric
identifier of an individual that has been enrolled for
91

WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017).
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
93
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008).
94
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
95
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017).
92
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a commercial purpose: (b) May retain the biometric
identifier no longer than is reasonably necessary to
(i) Comply with a court order, statute, or public
records retention schedule specified under federal,
state, or local law; (ii) Protect against or prevent
actual or potential fraud, criminal activity, claims,
security threats, or liability; and (iii) Provide the
services for which the biometric identifier was
enrolled.96
The WBPA makes no mention of a deletion timeline for
biometric data collected. CUBI and BIPA, by contrast, both
address this possibility in their text. CUBI states “(c) A person who
possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that is captured for
a commercial purpose: (3) shall destroy the biometric identifier
within a reasonable time, but not later than the first anniversary of
the date the purpose for collecting the identifier expires . . . .”97
BIPA’s retention requirements are the most comprehensive,
stating:
Section 15. Retention; collection; disclosure,
destruction.
(a) A private entity in possession of biometric
identifiers or biometric information must develop a
written policy, made available to the public,
establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently destroying biometric identifiers and
biometric information when the initial purpose for
collecting or obtaining such identifiers or
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of
the individual’s last interaction with the private
entity, whichever occurs first. Absent a valid
warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, a private entity in possession of
biometric identifiers or biometric information must

96
97

WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(3) (2009).
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comply with its established retention schedule and
destruction guidelines.98
D. Reasonable Care
The three state laws also all rely on some version of a
“reasonable care” objectivity standard when addressing how
biometric data in the employ of a private entity or person should be
protected, with each statute producing a different outcome.99
Illinois’s BIPA includes the most detailed description of how
biometric data is to be protected:
Section 15. Retention; collection; disclosure,
destruction.
(e) A private entity in possession of a biometric
identifier or biometric information shall: (1) store,
transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric
identifiers and biometric information using the
reasonable standard of care within the private
entity’s industry; and (2) store, transmit, and protect
from disclosure all biometric identifiers and
biometric information in a manner that is the same
as or more protective than the manner in which the
private entity stores, transmits, and protects other
confidential and sensitive information.100
Illinois’s standard for biometric data protection can be boiled
down to two main attributes: using reasonable care as defined
within a private entity’s industry and treating it similarly to how
the individual entity treats other confidential and sensitive
information.101 The first requirement is effectively an objectivity
standard focused on market custom by measuring a private entity’s
protection against other similar entities in the market or industry.102
The second measures an entity’s protection of biometric data

98

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
100
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
101
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e) (2008).
102
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(1) (2008).
99
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against its protection of other sensitive data.103 Similarly, Texas’s
CUBI has two primary requirements:
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of
an individual that is captured for a commercial
purpose: (2) shall store, transmit, and protect from
disclosure the biometric identifier using reasonable
care and in a manner that is the same as or more
protective than the manner in which the person
stores, transmits, and protects any other confidential
information the person possesses . . . 104
Unlike BIPA’s first requirement, CUBI’s reasonable care
standard is a regular objectivity standard.105 CUBI’s second
requirement, however, is effectively the same as BIPA’s second,
tasking private entities in possession of biometric data to protect it
as it would other confidential information.106 WBPA has only one
primary requirement for protecting biometric data, merely tasking
persons who knowingly possesses commercially-purposed
biometric data that has been enrolled to “take reasonable care to
guard against unauthorized access to and acquisition of biometric
identifiers that are in possession or under the control of the
person . . .”107 WBPA’s requirement is, like CUBI’s first
requirement, a reasonable care objectivity standard.108
E. The Sale and Release of Biometric Data
Each statute broadly prevents private entities in possession of
biometric data from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting
that data.109 Notably, BIPA is the only statute of the three to
distinguish between sale and disclosure of biometric data.
103

See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(e)(2) (2008).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
105
Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/15(e) (2008).
106
Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/15(e) (2008).
107
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
108
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001(c)(2) (2009).
109
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
104
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Regarding the sale of biometric data, BIPA’s requirements prohibit
such practices absolutely, stating: “No private entity in possession
of a biometric identifier or biometric information may sell, lease,
trade, or otherwise profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric
identifier or biometric information.”110 For disclosure or release of
biometric data, BIPA states:
(d) No private entity in possession of a biometric
identifier or biometric information may disclose,
redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s or a
customer’s biometric identifier or biometric
information unless: (1) the subject of the biometric
identifier or biometric information or the subject’s
legally authorized representative consents to the
disclosure or redisclosure; (2) the disclosure or
redisclosure completes a financial transaction
requested or authorized by the subject of the
biometric identifier or the biometric information or
the subject’s legally authorized representative; (3)
the disclosure or redisclosure is required by State or
federal law or municipal ordinance; or (4) the
disclosure is required pursuant to a valid warrant or
subpoena issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Both CUBI and WBPA take a different approach, addressing
the sale and disclosure of biometric data simultaneously. Such an
approach allows for scenarios in which the sale of biometric data is
allowed, unlike BIPA. CUBI provides:
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of
an individual that is captured for a commercial
purpose: (1) may not sell, lease, or otherwise
disclose the biometric identifier to another person
unless: (A) the individual consents to the disclosure
for identification purposes in the event of the
individual’s disappearance or death; (B) the
disclosure completes a financial transaction that the
individual requested or authorized; (C) the
110

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2008).
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disclosure is required or permitted by a federal
statute or by a state statute other than Chapter 552,
Government Code; or (D) the disclosure is made by
or to a law enforcement agency for a law
enforcement purpose in response to a
warrant . . . .111
The WBPA, meanwhile, has an even broader list of exemptions
than CUBI.112 Most notably, the WBPA includes an exemption for
disclosure and sale to any third party who contractually promises
not to disclose the data or enroll it for use inconsistent with the
original businesses uses.
F. Purpose of Law
Another provision shared by only two statutes is the explicit
mention of a purpose for the law, included in Illinois’s BIPA and
the WBPA. Likely due to the real-world circumstances that lead to
the drafting of BIPA, the Illinois statute’s purpose is
comprehensive and detailed:
Section 5. Legislative findings; intent. The General
Assembly finds all of the following:
(a) The use of biometrics is growing in the business
and security screening sectors and appears to
111

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
Here, the WBPA provides:
(3) Unless consent has been obtained from the individual, a person who has enrolled
an individual’s biometric identifier may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the
biometric identifier to another person for a commercial purpose unless the
disclosure: (a) Is consistent with subsections (1), (2), and (4) of this section; (b) Is
necessary to provide a product or service subscribed to, requested, or expressly
authorized by the individual; (c) Is necessary to effect, administer, enforce, or
complete a financial transaction that the individual requested, initiated, or
authorized, and the third party to whom the biometric identifier is disclosed
maintains confidentiality of the biometric identifier and does not further disclose the
biometric identifier except as otherwise permitted under this subsection (3); (d) Is
required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or court order; (e) Is
made to a third party who contractually promises that the biometric identifier will
not be further disclosed and will not be enrolled in a database for a commercial
purpose inconsistent with the notice and consent described in this subsection (3) and
subsections (1) and (2) of this section; or (f) Is made to prepare for litigation or to
respond to or participate in judicial process.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
112
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promise streamlined financial transactions and
security screenings. (b) Major national corporations
have selected the City of Chicago and other
locations in this State as pilot testing sites for new
applications of biometric-facilitated financial
transaction, including finger-scan technologies at
grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias.
(c) Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers
that are used to access finances or other sensitive
information. For example, social security numbers,
when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics,
however, are biologically unique to the individual;
therefore, once compromised, the individual has no
recourse, is at the heightened risk for identity theft,
and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated
transactions. (d) An overwhelming majority of
members of the public are weary of the use of
biometrics when such information is tired to
finances and other person information. (e) Despite
limited State law regulating the collection, use,
safeguarding, and storage of biometrics, many
members of the public are deterred from partaking
in biometric identifier-facilitated transactions. (f)
The full ramifications of biometric technology are
not fully known. (g) The public welfare, security,
and safety will be served by regulating the
collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage,
retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers
and information.113
Particularly of note in this statement of purpose is reference to
both public weariness of biometric technology and the
acknowledgment of unknown dangers that biometric data might
present.114 This motivation suggests that Illinois lawmakers were
likely particularly worried about the danger of biometric data
breaches and that BIPA, as a result, was cautiously drafted with

113
114

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008).
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(d)–(f) (2008).
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these concerns in mind. The WBPA’s statement of intent is more
concise and straightforward:
The legislature finds that citizens of Washington are
increasingly asked to disclose sensitive biological
information that uniquely identifies them for
commerce, security, and convenience. The
collection and marketing of biometric information
about individuals, without consent or knowledge of
the individual whose data is collected, is of
increasing concern. The legislature intends to
require a business that collects and can attribute
biometric data to a specific uniquely identified
individual to disclose how it uses that biometric
data, and provide notice to and obtain consent from
an individual before enrolling or changing the use
of that individual’s biometric identifiers in a
database.115
Texas’s CUBI lacks any specific mention of the Texas
legislatures intent or purpose behind passing the Act.116
G. Remedies
Each of these statutes offers mechanisms by which a private
entity in violation of the law can be held accountable.
1. The Private Right of Action
The most direct approach is a private right of action provided
by the first law to address biometric authentication, BIPA:
Section 20.
Right of action. Any person aggrieved by a
violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a
State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in
federal district court against an offending party. A
prevailing party may recover for each violation: (1)
against a private entity that negligently violates a

115
116

WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.900 (2017).
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
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provision of this Act, liquidated damages of $1,000
of actual damages, whichever is greater; (2) against
a private entity that intentionally or recklessly
violates a provision of this Act, liquidated damages
of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater;
(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including
expert witness fees and other litigation expenses;
and (4) other relief, including an injunction, as the
State or federal court may deem appropriate.117
BIPA is the only statute of the three to offer a private right of
action.118
2. State Attorneys General Enforcement
CUBI provides its own civil action through the state attorney
general, stating that “[a] person who violates this section is subject
to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation. The
attorney general may bring an action to recover the civil
penalty.”119 Similarly to CUBI, WBPA may only be enforce
through the state attorney general.120 Unlike CUBI, however, this
enforcement mechanism is not provided in the text of the statute
but through the Washington Consumer Protection Act.121
Violations of the WBPA are considered unfair or deceptive acts or
methods of competition and carry a maximum civil penalty of twothousand dollars.122
H. Additional Provisions
Uniquely, the WBPA is the only biometric privacy statute to
date that includes something called the “security purpose”
117

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).
See id.
119
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(d) (2009).
120
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.030(2) (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001(d) (2009).
121
See Civil Penalties, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.140 (1983); Lara Tumeh,
Washington’s New Biometric Privacy Statute and How It Compares to Illinois and Texas
Law, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY LAW WATCH (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.alston.com//media/files/insights/publications/2017/10/tumehbiometriclaws-privacylawwatch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CQ9K-PVWV].
122
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.140 (1983).
118
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exemption.123 The statute gives a list of general requirements that
private entities are expected to meet to remain in compliance with
the WBPA.124 The seventh provision of this section provides that
“[n]othing in this section requires an entity to provide notice and
obtain consent to collect, capture, or enroll a biometric identifier
and store it in a biometric system, or otherwise, in furtherance of a
security purpose.”125 This purpose, as defined in the statute’s
definitions section, means “the purpose of preventing shoplifting,
fraud, or any other misappropriation or theft of a thing of value,
including tangible and intangible goods, services, and other
purposes in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of
software, accounts, applications, online services, or any person.”126
CUBI also contains a unique provision regarding retention of
employee biometrics: “If a biometric identifier captured for a
commercial purpose has been collected for security purposes by an
employer, the purpose for collecting the identifier under
Subsection (c)(3) is presumed to expire on termination of the
employment relationship.”127
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AND OTHER
POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS
This Part will address the strengths and weaknesses of the
current enacted biometric data privacy statutes, discuss how the
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act’s private right of action
can provide a model for future biometric privacy laws, and explore
novel provisions future statutes might incorporate. Section IV.A
will discuss how BIPA’s provisions might provide the best
protection for consumers concerned about their biometric security
over CUBI and the WBPA. Section IV.B will examine the
insufficiencies of the Washington Biometric Privacy Act and the
Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act. Section IV.C will address
the ways in which the Washington Biometric Act and the Texas
123
124
125
126
127

See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
See id.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017).
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009).
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Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act can also contribute to the
future development of biometric privacy statutes. Finally, Section
IV.D will discuss novel ways in which future biometric privacy
statutes can be improved.
A. The Biometric Information Privacy Act’s Supremacy
1. The Strength of the Private Right of Action
Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act was created in the
aftermath of a private entity dissolving, leaving questions for
consumers about what would become of their sensitive financial
and biometric data.128 The act’s purpose, in many ways, reflects
modern anxieties surrounding data insecurity with mentions of
public wariness of novel technology and the potential unknown
risks involved. While biometric authentication technology is used
more often by the average adult today,129 many Americans believe
they have lost control of their data and are unsure of how to regain
it.130 This sentiment could hardly be considered surprising
considering how few data breach victims are able to successfully
hold compromised private entities legally accountable for their
failure to protect sensitive information.131 To that end, the
inclusion of BIPA’s private right of action is perhaps one of the
most unique and vital aspects of the statute. The right to hold
compromised private entities personally accountable for their
failure to adequately secure sensitive biometric data is rarely
enshrined so explicitly for data breach victims. The right of action
provides a mechanism through which compromised consumers can
avoid the class certification challenges present in already rare data
breach class action suits. The private right can also provide an
alternate means to bring suit against private entities with forced
arbitration clauses that specifically prohibit class action suits.

128

See Kay, supra note 51, at 1.
See Koma, supra note 17.
130
See Mary Louise Kelly, Most Americans Feel They’ve Lost Control of Their Online
Data, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/601148172/mostamericans-feel-theyve-lost-control-control-of-their-online-data [https://perma.cc/SDB7EUJJ].
131
See discussion supra Sections I–II.
129

2019]

FACE OFF

599

The damages floors enshrined in BIPA’s right of action are
also worth noting. A prevailing party can recover $1,000 or actual
damages, whichever is greater, should a private entity negligently
violate BIPA.132 That damage floor rises to $5,000 if it is found
that the private entity intentionally or recklessly violated the
statute.133 The right of action also provides for attorney’s fees and
costs.134 While BIPA’s critics have argued the statute’s right of
action may lead to frivolous lawsuits,135 there is little to suggest
that BIPA suits have become unduly burdensome on Illinois
businesses. Given the surge in BIPA related class action suits, it is
possible that the inclusion of damage floors might make BIPA
unduly burdensome on smaller businesses that may be subject to
BIPA suits.136 Such disincentivizing, however, is likely in the best
interest of data security as small businesses are often at greater risk
of cyberattacks and small to medium sized businesses account for
over half of all data breaches that occur daily.137 Further, the
inclusion of damage floors in BIPA likely help incentivize larger
businesses to make sure they remain compliant with the statute’s
conditions.
Similar to broader data breach suits, questions have arisen as to
whether actual injury must be proven to proceed with BIPA’s right
of action. In McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., the plaintiff
brought suit against Smart Carte, Inc. for its failure to obtain her
written consent for her biometric identifier or to inform her of their
data retention policy after she used one of their fingerprint enabled
132

See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).
See id.
134
See id.
135
See Karla Grossenbacher & Christopher W. Kelleher, Hazards Ahead: Uptick In
Biometric Privacy Laws Can Put Employees In Hot Seat, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Oct. 3,
2017), https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/10/hazards-ahead-uptickin-biometric-privacy-laws-can-put-employers-in-hot-seat/
[https://perma.cc/P2G3HKL7].
136
See id; Steven Pearlman, Eddie Young & Alex Weinstein, The New Wave OF
Employee Biometrics Class Actions, LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2017, 11:24 AM),
https://www.law360.com/cybersecurity-privacy/articles/972212/the-new-wave-ofemployee-biometrics-class-actions?nl_pk=d5154baa-3c0f-408d-8f5ee2a35a0f4b2c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=cybersecu
rity-privacy&read_more=1 [https://perma.cc/YC5R-WSQP].
137
See INSUREON, supra note 12.
133
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lockers.138 The court in McCollough found the plaintiff lacked
Article III standing as Smart Carte’s violation of BIPA was merely
technical and created no concrete injury.139 Unlike some data
breach suits however, economic harm is not necessarily required
by courts to bring a successful BIPA suit.140 In Monroy v.
Shutterfly, Inc., Shutterfly automatically collected the facial
geometry of the plaintiff without his consent when a third party
uploaded a picture of his face and tagged it with his name.141
Although the plaintiff’s information was not compromised, the
court recognized a violation of his privacy as concrete harm.142
This matter was most recently addressed in Rosenbach v. Six
Flags. In Rosenbach, Six Flags, an amusement park, collected the
plaintiff’s fingerprint identifier in exchange for entering the park
using a “season pass.”143 When doing so, however, Six Flags gave
the plaintiff no notice and did not obtain written consent from
him.144 Consequently, the plaintiff’s mother, Stacy Rosenbach,
brought suit on his behalf. The Court, which did not cite Spokeo in
its holding,145 paid special attention to the Illinois General
Assembly’s stated purpose of BIPA, stating:
It is clear that the legislature intended for this
provision to have substantial force. When private
entities face liability for failure to comply with the
law’s requirements without requiring affected
individuals or customers to show some injury
beyond violation of their statutory rights, those
entities have the strongest possible incentive to
conform to the law and prevent problems before the
138

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100404, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016).
See id. at *5.
140
See generally Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 IL App (2d) 170317;
Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16-C-10984, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *27
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017).
141
See Monroy, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149604, at *1–3.
142
See id. at *26–27.
143
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at ¶¶ 4–9.
144
See id.; Season Passes & Memberships, SIX FLAGS (July 2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140706110138/https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/sto
re/season-passes [https://perma.cc/FCG8-CSJX].
145
See Rosenbach, 2019 IL.
139
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occur and cannot be undone. Compliance should not
be difficult; whatever expenses a business might
incur to meet the law’s requirements are likely to be
insignificant compared to the substantial and
irreversible harm that could result if biometric
identifiers and information are not properly
safeguarded; and the public welfare, security, and
safety will be advanced. That is the point of the law.
To require individuals to wait until they have
sustained some compensable injury beyond
violation of their statutory rights before they may
seek recourse, as defendants urge, would be
completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative and
deterrent purposes.146
The Court makes it clear that the actual harm question
befuddling other courts dealing with data breach victims is simply
not a relevant consideration when the legislature is explicit and the
potential for harm is this high:
When a private entity fails to adhere to the statutory
procedures, as defendants are alleged to have done
here, “the right of the individual to maintain [his or]
her biometric privacy vanishes into thin air. The
precise harm the Illinois legislature sought to
prevent is then realized.” This is no mere
“technicality.” The injury is real and significant.147
Rosenbach’s language is not insignificant. The Illinois State
Supreme Court’s declaration that a per se violation of BIPA is
146

Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 37. Curiously, but for the Illinois General
Assembly’s inclusion of BIPA’s purpose, tension might exist between the holdings in
Spokeo and Rosenbach. The Court’s opinion in Spokeo, while recognizing intangible
harms as concrete, explicitly clarified that a plaintiff must allege more than a “bare
procedural violation” of the statute that is “divorced from” the real harms that FCRA is
designed to prevent. Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). The Court’s
opinion in Rosenbach makes clear that Six Flags’ violation of BIPA is concrete because,
according to statute’s purpose, it is the exact kind of privacy harm BIPA was created to
prevent. See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 34 (citing Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F.
Supp. 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)).
147
See Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, at ¶ 34 (citing Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp.
948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)).
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harm sufficient to form a cause of action is exceptionally proconsumer, holding irresponsible data firms accountable for failing
to take even basic statutory measures to protect biometric
privacy.148 This holding represents a forward-thinking judicial
perspective in addressing statutorily protected privacy harms. For
these reasons, BIPA’s private right of action, along with a
comprehensive statement of purpose on behalf of the drafting
legislatures, should be incorporated in future biometric privacy
statutes serious about protecting privacy rights.
2. A Prohibition on Selling Biometric Data
BIPA’s restrictions against private entities selling consumer
biometric data is also exemplary compared to its successors.
Although all three statutes contain provisions allowing for the
disclosure of biometric data should the completion of a financial
transaction or federal law require,149 BIPA strictly forbids private
entities from selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from a
consumer’s biometric data with no exceptions.150 While both
CUBI and WBPA generally disallow the selling of user biometric
data, both statutes have a host of exemptions to this requirement,
some questionable.151 In Texas, a private entity may sell biometric
data in the event of a user’s “disappearance or death.”152 While a
deceased consumer might not have any need for their biometric
information, there does not seem to be a compelling reason why
that data could be sold as opposed to destroyed. The WBPA offers
an even larger list of exemptions, going as far as to allow a private
entity to sell biometric data to third parties so long as the third
party “contractually promises” not to further disclose or enroll the
information.153 Such a disclosure appears to have a very low
threshold for a private entity and could potentially raise further
questions as to the statute’s ability to adequately protect data. By
148

See id.
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
150
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2008).
151
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §
503.001 (2009).
152
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
153
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
149
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outright disallowing the sale of user biometric data, BIPA requires
a higher level of security from private entities and disincentivizes
the sale of consumer data.
3. The Written Retention & Deletion Policy
Finally, BIPA’s requirement of a written policy surrounding
biometric collection that must be public to consumers and enforced
by a private entity is a strong policy. Such a provision helps to
incentivize private entities to incorporate a compliance aspect in
their collection of biometric data which, ideally, can help to
prevent future litigation under BIPA. Further, a public biometrics
policy can help consumers make more informed choices about who
they choose to store their sensitive data with, allowing them to feel
more in control of their own data.
B. The Washington Biometric Act and Capture or Use Biometric
Identifier Act Information Act’s Insufficiency
1. The Security Purpose Exception
While each of the three state biometric privacy statutes have
flaws in how they regulate the protection of user data, the
Washington Biometric Privacy Act’s shortcomings are particularly
troubling. Despite being the most recent of the three statutes,
several provisions of the WBPA raise serious questions about its
effectiveness in regulating private entities, none more so than the
“security purpose” exception. While biometric authentication is not
exclusively used as a means of security, it does account for the
overwhelming majority of its use.154 Should this exception have
only applied to tangible goods or services, it is possible that the
purpose of the WBPA could remain intact, although unduly
burdened. However, the broadness of this exception’s language,
and the vagueness of the term “other purposes,” are difficult to
overstate. Given that one of the main purposes of biometric
technology is to secure physical and digital spaces from unverified
154

See Alexandro Pando, Beyond Security: Biometrics Integration into Everyday Life,
FORBES (Aug. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil
/2017/08/04/beyond-security-biometrics-integration-into-everyday-life/#38724d81431f
[https://perma.cc/27N3-TLN7].
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users, this exception effectively undermines the WBPA’s
effectiveness.
Beyond the security purpose, there are also concerns about the
WBPA’s definition of “biometric identifiers.” The statute lists a
general definition for a biometric identifier before listing
examples, however, facial recognition is notably absent from the
types of identifiers listed.155 Although Representative Jeff Morris,
the WBPA’s prime sponsor, has argued that the exclusion of facial
recognition from the definition does not necessarily preclude its
inclusion, some attorneys worry that courts will exclude that
particular biometric identifier when assessing the WBPA opening
citizens up to the danger of having their faces catalogued without
their knowledge or consent.156
2. State Attorneys General Action
While it is possible to enforce both CUBI and WBPA through
their respective state attorney generals, this option does not offer
victims of data breaches the opportunity to be compensated for a
private entity’s failure to protect their data.157 As noted in Section
II.D, AGs, while perhaps instrumental in shaping data privacy
norms, have the ultimate discretion in choosing what lawsuits to
file and are susceptible to political capture.158 While scholars have
noted that it is unlikely that all fifty state AGs would be politically
captured by anti-consumer interests,159 this is a small comfort to
consumers in captured states.160
155

See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017).
See Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois
Cousin, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washington-biometricprivacy-n73014461920/ [https://perma.cc/994F-CZZ5].
157
See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
158
See supra Section II.D.
159
See Citron, supra note 83, at 803–04.
160
Further, the author of this Note was unable to find any Texas suits brought under
CUBI through Westlaw, Westlaw Litigation Analytics, or Lexis as of February 27, 2019.
While the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, the dearth of information
surrounding CUBI AG suits is likely the result of few, if any, CUBI suits ever being
filed. See Fred Shapiro, The Absence of Proof, FREAKONOMICS (Sept. 29, 2011, 2:32 PM),
http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/29/the-absence-of-proof/
[https://perma.cc/9SCW3ZS4]. On March 22, 2019, the author submitted a Public Information Act Request to the
Texas Attorney General requesting information or documentation relating to any actions
156
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C. What the Other Biometric Statutes Have to Offer
1. The Washington Biometric Privacy Act
Although the WBPA might largely be ineffective at protecting
data, the statute’s novel focus on the regulation of the enrollment
of biometric data as opposed to its collection might be a beneficial
element to incorporate into future biometric privacy laws. Both
BIPA and CUBI primarily regulate the ways in which private
entities can collect and capture biometric data.161 CUBI states that
“a person may not capture a biometric identifier of an individual
for a commercial purpose unless the person: (1) informs the
individual before capturing the biometric identifier; and (2)
receives the individual’s consent to capture the biometric
identifier.”162 Similarly, BIPA states:
(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase,
receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a
person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or
biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the
subject or the subject’s legally authorized
representative in writing that the biometric identifier
or biometric information is being collected or
stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject’s
legally authorized representative in writing of the
specific purpose and length of term for which a
biometric identifier or biometric information is
being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a
written release executed by the subject of the
or litigation brought under the Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act from the statute’s
inception through February 27, 2019, including matters ending in settlements. On April 5,
2019, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas responded to Public Information
Request No. R000722 stating that “the OAG has reviewed its files and has no
information responsive to your request.” Letter from June B. Harden, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, to Maya Rivera, Managing Editor,
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal (Apr. 5, 2019) (on
file with author). Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the Office of the
Attorney General of Texas has never brought a CUBI action since the statute’s inception,
highlighting the potential inefficiency of State AG enforcement.
161
Compare TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009), with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.
14/15 (2008).
162
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
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biometric identifier or biometric information or the
subject’s legally authorized representative.163
Conversely, the WBPA states that “a person may not enroll a
biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose,
without first providing notice, obtaining consent, or providing a
mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of a biometric identifier
for a commercial purpose.”164 According to the statute “‘enroll’
means to capture a biometric identifier of an individual, convert it
into a reference template that cannot be reconstructed into the
original output image, and store it in a database that matches the
biometric identifier to a specific individual.”165
The divergence from BIPA and CUBI is significant as it places
a greater emphasis on how private entities use the biometric data
they collect by only regulating data that is being stored in a
database to be used again in the future. Such an approach can
prevent private entities who may be collecting biometric data for a
very limited period of time from being subject to the various
conditions of the WBPA. Further, the definition of “enroll”
appears to prescribe a specific format in which biometric data
should be stored that prevents the identifier from being
reconstructed from the data to the original image. This templating
can make biometric identifiers more difficult to steal as hackers
who steal biometric data will not be able to easily reconstruct the
original identifier. Finally, while BIPA and CUBI both require
private entities to inform consumers and receive their express
consent before capturing biometric data, the WBPA requires only
one of three conditions: notice, consent, or a mechanism to
unenroll one’s data.166 These requirements appear to be less
burdensome and more adaptable then the requirements for
capturing such data under BIPA or CUBI allowing for data
enrollment on a flexible, individualized basis. Overall, these
enrollment requirements combined with the positive elements of

163
164
165
166

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2008).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2017).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
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BIPA could make for stronger biometric privacy statutes in the
future.
2. The Capture or Use Biometric Identifier Act
CUBI is notably the only state biometric privacy statute to date
that contains a provision addressing the retention and deletion of
employee biometric data, specifically requiring that employers
delete such data shortly after an employee’s termination.167 With
recent surveys suggesting that upwards of 64% of workplaces now
incorporate biometrics for security and business purposes, this
prescient CUBI provision would make for a wise addition to future
biometric privacy legislation.168
D. Other Considerations for Future Biometric Privacy Statutes
There are several additional measures that future biometric
privacy statutes can incorporate to best protect privacy rights and
ensure an informed judiciary.
1. Meaningful Consent via Opt-out and Alternatives
As businesses increasingly adopt biometric measures for
employees and consumers,169 it is paramount that consumers be
given real choices in determining who to entrust their data to and
when. Key to this interest is an individual’s right to opt-out of a
service or aspects of a service whenever she feels a business can no
longer be trusted. It is not sufficient that consent must only be
given once for a firm to have potentially indefinite use of biometric
data; the consent must be meaningful, meaning certain uses of the
data should be optional and the consent can be revoked at any
time. A meaningful consent provision, as enshrined in the Fair
Information Practice Principles and, now, in the General Data
Protection Regulations (“GDPR”) in the European Union, would
guarantee that an individual has ultimate control over their
167

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(2) (2009).
See Roy Maurer, More Employers Are Using Biometric Authentication, SOC.
HUMAN RES. MGMT (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/technology/pages/employers-using-biometric-authentication.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4BRZ-QGUV].
169
See VISA, supra note 5.
168
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biometric data, a type of control that the sensitivity of biometric
information should warrant.170 When a consumer triggers such a
provision, the target business would be expected to offer an
alternative means of authentication to the user and, once in place,
delete the user’s biometric identifier from its records. While some
firms, now including Six Flags,171 allow alternative means of
authentication when biometrics are involved, enshrining a
mandatory opt-out procedure that incorporates meaningful consent
would better hold firms to account in recognizing the privacy
rights of consumers. Failure to comply with such a provision could
result in liability via the private right to action.
2. Appointment of Special Masters
Another suggestion for improving future biometric privacy
statutes would be to incorporate a mechanism to allow judges to
consult with neutral, third party experts familiar with best data
security practices. While the statutes’ reasonable care standards

170

See The Fair Information Principles, PRIVACY FIRST, https://www.privacyfirst.nl
/acties-3/item/154-the-fair-information-principles-canada.html [https://perma.cc/E5NDDLS8] (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); Regulation 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural
Persons With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. L 119, art. 7. The GDPR explicitly defines “biometric data” under Article 4 as
“personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical,
physiological, or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm
the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic
data.” Regulation 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119, ch. 1, art. 4.
The GDPR’s inclusion of “physical, physiological, [and] behavioural characteristics” as
biometric identifiers appear to be an implicit acknowledgment of the potential for
biometric technology to evolve beyond our current understanding. See Danny Ross,
“Processing Biometric Data? Be Careful, Under the GDPR,” IAPP (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://iapp.org/news/a/processing-biometric-data-be-careful-under-the-gdpr/
[https://perma.cc/T984-MUY4]. Businesses collecting biometric identifiers of European
Union citizens should be especially wary of how such information is stored given the
GDPR’s harsh penalties. See generally “GDPR Enforcement and Penalties,” IT
GOVERNANCE (last visited Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/dpa-and-gdprpenalties [https://perma.cc/7CVF-YYF7].
171
See Season Passes & Memberships, SIX FLAGS (2019), https://web.archive.org
/web/20190122020232/https://www.sixflags.com/greatamerica/store/season-passes
[https://perma.cc/45DY-D529].
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provide a general guideline as to how to appropriately store and
protect biometric data, it can be difficult to say what exactly
reasonable care entails with regards to data security. Conversely, it
is unreasonable and likely impossible to prescribe specific methods
of data security as technology often moves so quickly that
legislators cannot be expected to regularly update statutes with the
latest best security practices. Consequently, giving judges the
ability to consult with data security experts, à la Federal Rule of
Evidence 706, when the appropriate level of security is unclear
might provide for more equitable outcomes in future biometric
privacy suits, especially as methods for data security evolve over
the years.172
Some courts currently allow the appointment of “special
masters” at the behest of parties or judges which allow a judge to
delegate certain trial processes to a subject-matter expert capable
of verifying specialized information.173 These special masters have
been used to supervise discovery, oversee settlement negotiations,
and, usefully here, make recommendations to attorneys regarding
damages in cases with difficult fact patterns.174 Including
provisions recommending the use of such special masters might be
beneficial in determining whether a privacy defendant employed
appropriate encryption and security of biometric data when a
breach occurs.
CONCLUSION
In “Privacy As Trust,” Ari Waldman notes that “strong trust
norms are what allow sharing and social interaction to occur.”175
When it comes to data as sensitive and irreplaceable as biometric
identifiers, trust placed in private entities is especially strong.
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Today, however, this trust is beginning to break down.176 Many
Americans worry that they have no control over their data and do
not know how to reclaim it.177 When a data breach occurs, victims
can be anxious about the heightened risk of identity theft and fraud
they find themselves in, even when the data stolen can be changed
or otherwise rendered useless.178 With biometric data, the risk a
data breach poses is not temporary, but can last for as long as the
victim may live. The Biometric Information Privacy Act was
drafted at a time when legislators shared these concerns and were
worried about the potential ramifications of a biometric data
breach.179 As it happens, this wariness was prescient. The strict
restrictions on the sale of biometric data and the inclusion of a
private right of action with high damage floors were, in a very real
sense, experimental as a biometric privacy statute had never been
created before. However, these elements both prioritize the safety
of consumer biometric data and empower consumers to hold
private entities accountable in a way that is almost unheard of in
data privacy law today. Though newer biometric privacy laws with
fresh ideas have been introduced in the years since BIPA was
made law, the most significant principles of the original statute
should ultimately remain a lodestar for new biometric privacy
legislation to follow. Further, the incorporation of meaningful
consent and the appointment of special masters can also improve
future biometric privacy, giving consumers more control over their
data.
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